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DEFENDING PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND DEFINING
BRAZIL'S ENVIRONMENTAL "PUBLIC INTEREST":
A REVIEW OF LESLEY MCALLISTER'S
MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL
COLIN CRAWFORD*
In her valuable new book, Making Law Matter: Environmental Pro-
tection and Legal Institutions in Brazil, Professor Lesley McAllister
argues that in Brazil the "involvement of legal institutions is a route
toward enhancing the effectiveness of environmental law."' The
picture Professor McAllister draws in Making Law Matter, based
upon her doctoral thesis for the Energy and Resources Group at
the University of California, Berkeley, is one that, she says, "tells an
atypical story about environmental law in a developing country,"
atypical in that it was prosecutors and the courts who "helped
develop a robust, effective environmental regulatory system in Bra-
zil."2 As such, Professor McAllister maintains, "Brazil stands as a
model of how developing countries can empower their legal insti-
tutions to act in ways that make environmental law matter."3
At the outset, it is essential to note what an important service
Making Law Matters performs, not only for legal writing in English
about Brazil, but more generally for legal writing in English about
countries in development. Specifically, Professor McAllister's focus
is on the dynamics of legal institutions and the process that leads to
their creation. This is terrifically important work for a country like
Brazil, with a democracy that, in 2009, is just a quarter-century old.
Despite the strength of its laws, enforcement remains a problem in
Brazil (a point covered more extensively below). Thus, a focus on
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Co-Director, Center
for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan Growth and Program Director, Summer Legal
& Policy Study in Rio de Janeiro. J.D. 1988, Harvard Law School; M.A. 1982, Corpus
Christi College, Cambridge; B.A. 1980, Columbia University. Jorge Esquirol provided use-
ful comments on an early draft of this review. I am grateful to Erica Oleszczuk and Ashton
Phillips of this law review for their thoughtful editing and critical comments.
1. LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL xii (2008).
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id.
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institutional operation-the nitty-gritty, day-to-day work of legal
actors and institutions-helps fill a huge void in our understanding
about how law can come to serve an important role in new democ-
racies and developing societies. Professor McAllister's choice to do
this cannot be celebrated enough.
Before scrutinizing Professor McAllister's claims about her "atyp-
ical story," it is necessary, first, to describe the institutional focus of
Professor McAllister's attention, namely the Minist~io Ptiblico.
Although the Ministrrio Pfiblico, which literally translates as "Pub-
lic Ministry," is usually described to English speakers as the
equivalent of the Office of the Attorney General, its powers and
potential are in fact much greater than that of its nearest U.S.
equivalent. 4 Based upon European models and in particular the
French Minist~re Public, the Ministrrio Pfiblico has its roots in the
medieval French legal system.5 The institution passed to Portugal
and subsequently to its Brazilian colony in the fifteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, respectively.6 Although historically responsible to
exercise "the state's monopoly on accusing and prosecuting
criminals," such prosecutorial entities "have also historically held
the power to intervene in and, in some cases, initiate civil litigation
that involves the interests of the general public."7
Professor McAllister describes how this expanded version of the
Ministrrio Pfiblico took root in Brazil, emboldened in particular by
the constitutional reforms of the mid-1980s, such that, today, the
Ministrrio Pdiblico is commonly recognized to constitute a "fourth
branch" of government.8 Its lawyers are paid by the government
and, formally, are members of the Justice Department (Minist&io
daJustifa), yet they make their living holding the very same govern-
ment accountable-that is, they make a habit of suing the very
branch of government that employs them to enforce the rule of
4. Professor McAllister herself suggests that it would better be translated "public
prosecution service" or "procuracy." Id. at 26 (citing Stefan Voigt, Power over Prosecutors
Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator, Law and Economics Work-
shop, University of California Berkeley, Paper 6, at 4 (Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://
repositories.cdlib.org/berkeley-law-econ/Fall2006/6/). "Procuracy," a rather odd
English-language usage, is used by Professor McAllister to refer to prosecutors' offices
generally.
5. See MCALLISTER, supra note 1, at 59.
6. Id. A useful, if abbreviated, description of the role of the Ministdrio Pliblico and
how it differs from that of U.S. prosecutors and other litigants in class actions can be found
in Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil-A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 Am. J. Comp. L.
311, 366-70 (2003).
7. MCALLISTER, supra note 1, at 59.
8. Id. at 65.
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law. Try to imagine, by contrast, an arm of the U.S. Department of
Justice suing the U.S. president and the administrator of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency for failing to enforce the envi-
ronmental laws, and one begins to appreciate the potential scope
of the Minist~rio Piiblico's authority. For most of us, the scenario
is unimaginable in the United States, and it emphasizes the consid-
erable power the Ministrio Ptiblico can wield.
As Professor McAllister notes, the Minist6rio Ptiblico typically
attracts Brazil's best and the brightest, top-ranking graduates of its
best law faculties. These people are accomplished, bright, and
ambitious, products of the brutally competitive Brazilian university
entrance examination-the vestibular-and, later, the equally chal-
lenging public employment examination system. 9 As recent Brazil-
ian news reports have emphasized, public employment evermore
constitutes the most attractive employment option for young
Brazilians because it is highly paid and, after an initial probationary
period, exceptionally secure. 10 For this reason, Professor McAl-
lister's assessment about the quality of the lawyers in the Minist~rio
Pfiblico seems likely to continue to hold true for some time. Thus,
Professor McAllister's focus on the role of the Minist6rio Ptiblico in
Brazilian law and in environmental law enforcement is timely.
As Professor McAllister explains, with the end of dictatorial rule
in many Latin American countries during the last two decades,
"almost all Latin American procuracies have undergone reforms as
their criminal justice systems have adopted features of the accusa-
tory (or adversary) model.""II In addition to gaining power in crim-
inal prosecutions, "[i]n Brazil, prosecutors also became extremely
active in civil litigation involving public interests such as consumer
defense, children's rights, disability rights, and worker health and
safety as well as environmental protection." 12 This development
reflects, she asserts, the 'judicialization of politics" in Latin
9. See, e.g., Camila Antunes, Do zero ao topo do ranking, VEJA, July 11, 2007, available at
http://veja.abril.com.br/110707/p-106.shtml (describing successful struggles of five can-
didates for university entrance and their good fortune once achieved); cf Abdias do Nasci-
mento & Elisa Larkin Nascimento, Dance of Deception: A Reading of Race Relations in Brazil, in
BEYOND RACISM: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE UNITED STATES
105, 115-17 (Charles V. Hamilton et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the inequalities of the Bra-
zilian educational system).
10. See, e.g,, Gabriela Carelli, Cinco milhies queren o governo como patrdo, VEJA, June 20,
2007, available at http://veja.abfil.com.br/200607/p_088.shtml (reporting that "Five mil-
lion [young people] want the government as [their] employer," and discussing the com-
petitiveness in seeking government positions).
11. McALUSTER, supra note 1, at 7.
12. Id.
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America, meaning "the 'increased presence of judicial processes
and court rulings in political and social life, and the increasing res-
olution of political, social or state-society conflicts in the courts.' "
13
This arguably represents increased cultural approval for the rule of
law. 14
This is not, by any means, a predictable result following the end
of military rule, the writing of a new constitution, and the ushering
in of a democratic form of government. It is common knowledge
that in Brazilian life the jeito-literally "the way"-and not law or
regulation, is how to get things done. Jeito in this sense refers to a
cultural tendency to rely upon personal connections and skill at
manipulating social and economic circumstances to one's advan-
tage. 15 As Professor McAllister notes, following earlier judgments
of the comparative law scholar Keith Rosenn, "the jeito ... includes
not only conventional corruption but also situations in which a
public servant deviates from the law because it is unrealistic or
unjust," adding that this "has been the norm rather than the excep-
tion in many areas of law."'1 6 Indeed, so deeply entrenched is the
power of jeito that, as Professor McAllister observes, "[a] 1996 sur-
vey of law students in the Brazilian state of Rio de Janeiro revealed
that only 6 percent believed that conflicts in Brazil were principally
resolved through the law and legal institutions; 94 percent consid-
ered the jeito or the 'law of the strongest' to be predominant.'
7
Thus, it is no small achievement, in Professor McAllister's concep-
tion, to "make law matter" (emphasis added) for environmental
protection in Brazil. Brazil is a country where, despite an abun-
13. Id. at 8 (quoting THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 3 (Rachel
Sieder, Line Schjolden & Alan Angell eds., 2005)).
14. See generally McALLISTER, supra note 1, at 10-13. Professor McAllister is careful to
note that the existence of the Minist~rio Pdiblico alone will not establish the rule of law in
Brazil, although she maintains that "[tuhe work of prosecutors stands as an important sym-
bol conveying the idea that the ruled and the rulers obey the same rules." Id. at 183.
15. Id. at 12 (stating that the jeito allows those with political and social connections
ways to get around the law); see also JOsEPH A. PAGE, THE BRAZILLANS 10 (1995) ("The jei-
tinho [literally, "little jeito"] personalizes a situation ostensibly governed by an impersonal
norm.").
16. McALLISTER, supra note 1, at 12 (citing Keith S. Rosenn, TheJeito: Brazil's Institu-
tional Bypass of the Formal Legal System and its Developmental Implications, 19 AM. J. COMP. L.
514, 515-16 (1971)).
17. Id. at 12-13 (citing Eliane Botelho Junqueira, Brazil: The Road of Conflict Bound for
Total Justice, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBAUIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN
EUROPE 64, 93-95 (L. M. Friedman & R. PCrez-Perdomo eds., 2003)).
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dance of thoughtful and well-constructed laws,' 8 cultural norms
and social practice often preclude observance of legal norms.
In Professor McAllister's understanding of recent Brazilian legal
history, the Minist~rio Pfiblico has played a central-if not the cen-
tral-role. Specifically, as she tells it, "Brazilian public prosecutors
became significant actors in the enforcement of environmental
laws and regulations in the 1980s."'19 This was important, in Profes-
sor McAllister's telling, because of the comparative weakness of
Brazilian environmental-enforcement agencies: "Environmental
agencies tend to be weak both in terms of their resources and their
power to coerce compliance. '" 20 As in the United States, Brazil has
federal and state environmental regulators. Thus, for example,
during the 1980s and 1990s, the National Council on the Environ-
ment (CONAMA) was active in advancing an environmental
agenda, with its resolutions gaining "increasing authority" and
"attaining the force of law and substituting to some extent for legis-
lative activity in the environmental area." 21 By contrast, at the state
level, again as in the United States, the resources for environmen-
tal enforcement at the agency level vary greatly.22 By 1987, for
example, fully 81 percent of all public expenditure on state envi-
ronmental agencies in Brazil occurred in two southeastern states,
namely Rio de Janeiro and Sdo Paulo.23
During the 1990s, however, "the political winds shifted," and
amidst a larger national political and economic crisis,
"[e]nvironmental agencies experienced significant resource
shortages as the Brazilian government cut budgets and froze hiring
in line with a series of fiscal reform measures." 24 It should come as
no surprise, therefore, that an audit of the federal environmental-
enforcement agency (IBAMA) "in the late 1990s found significant
18. This is a position with which Professor McAllister agrees, asserting that "Brazil's
laws were [sic] among the most rigorous and complete in the world, but they lacked com-
pliance." Id. at 4 (citing Paulo C. Vaz Guimar-es, Silvia F. MacDowell & Jacques
Demajorovic, Fiscalizafdo em meio ambiente no estado de Sdo Paulo, in Cadernos Fundap:
Revista Da Fundafiao Do Desenvolvimento Administrativo 20, 35-46 (1996)). See also id. at
20 (noting the abundance of detailed environmental protections enacted into Brazilian
law).
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id. at 20.
21. Id. at 23 (citing Ivan Carlos Maglio, A descentralizafdo da gestdo ambiental no Brasil: 0
papel dos 6rgdos estaduais e as rela6es corn o poder local (2000) (Master's thesis, Universidade
de Sao Paulo)).
22. See id. at 25, 29-31.
23. Id. at 28 (reporting that of that 81 percent total figure, 75 percent was in the state
of Sdo Paulo alone).
24. Id. at 32.
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weaknesses in the issuance and collection of administrative penal-
ties," with multiple errors in the issuance of those citations, not to
mention numerous other substantive and procedural weaknesses
in environmental administration. 25 At both the federal and the
state levels, environmental agencies suffered not only funding but
also significant staff cuts, and by the late 1990s, stories of wide-
spread corruption in IBAMA were rife, a situation fostered by the
"'politics of state absence.' "26
Professor McAllister provides a great service by chronicling these
developments in great detail, 27 drawing upon personal analysis of
administrative-sanction data and secondary sources. All of these
propel her to evaluate that
[a]s a general rule, Brazilian environmental agencies tend to be
among the least powerful agencies in the government. They
have difficulty defending policies and administrative actions that
run contrary to the priorities of political leaders and other gov-
ernmental agencies.
28
Professor McAllister concludes, therefore, that "Brazilian envi-
ronmental agencies, while varying widely in their capacities, have
not lived up to the promise of Brazilian environmental law.... The
result is a profound disconnect between environmental law 'on the
books' and environmental law as it operates in practice." 29
Into this breach, in Professor McAllister's telling of the story,
stepped the white knight of the Minist~rio Ptiblico.
The rise of the Minist~rio Ptiblico in the 1980s must be under-
stood, as Professor McAllister makes clear, in light of two phenom-
ena. First, the Ministfrio Piblico gained justification and power in
an exciting period of political and legal reform, the end of a 20-
year period of military rule, and the drafting of a new and expan-
sive "citizen's" constitution in 1988.30 Second, the budget and fis-
25. Id. at 36.
26. Id. at 40 (quoting KATHRYN HOCHSTETLER & MARGARET E. KECK, GREENING BRAZIL:
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM IN STATE AND SOCIETY 182 (2007)).
27. See id. at 39-56.
28. Id. at 41.
29. Id. at 55-56.
30. Although the formal name of the constitution is the "Constitui fio da Reptiblica
Federativa do Brasil de 1988," it is commonly called the "Citizen's Constitution" by consti-
tutional law scholars. See, e.g., Luis ROBERTO BARROsO, DOZE ANOS DA CONSTITUI;AO
BRASILEIRA DE 1988 (UMA BREVE E ACIDENTADA HISTORIA DE SUCESSo) 15, available at http:/
/www.cepc.es/rap/Publicaciones/Revistas/8/AIB_004_O11 .pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
The constitution and amendments appear in full, in Portuguese and English, in the Politi-
cal Database of the Americas maintained by Georgetown University. See Brazil: Constitu-
tions, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazil/brazil.html (last visited July 31,
2009).
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cal crises of the 1990s opened the way for a different institutional
voice and role.
With meticulous care, Professor McAllister chronicles the role of
smart, idealistic young lawyers in the redefinition of the Ministdrio
Ptiblico. This is perhaps the most useful portion of the book
because of its record of how legal institutions are made in a coun-
try without a strong tradition of democratic lawmaking. As she
explains, with the input of young lawyers and law professors, the
1988 Constitution came to contain an article specifically devoted to
environmental protection, including, for instance, the constitu-
tional requirement for environmental-impact statements, commit-
ments to biodiversity protection, and pollution controls.3 1  In
addition, restructuring and institution building of the Minist~rio
Ptiblico in the 1980s set the stage for a newly empowered
"procuracy,"32 one that would go well beyond its traditional role of
criminal prosecution, to "defending public interests through civil
litigation" as an "equally important part of its work."33 Just as the
class action represented a key development in U.S. law for the
defense of group rights such as civil, consumer, and environmental
rights, 34 so too in Brazil the increased potential for civil litigation
initiated by the Minist~rio Pfiblico was made possible by the intro-
duction and gradual acceptance of the notion of "diffuse and col-
lective interests."
35
The term "diffuse and collective interests" is essential to under-
standing the expanded role in Brazil of the Minist~rio Pfiblico.
Professor McAllister oddly relegates this important notion to a
footnote, although she usefully explains there that the term "is pre-
ferred to [public interest]," as that term is used in the United
States, because
[t] raditionally, "public interest" has been used in Brazil to refer
to interests of the state or government. "Diffuse interests," in
contrast, are those of society as a whole, defined in Brazilian law
as interests that are transindividual, indivisible by nature, and
31. Constituiq5o Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 225 (Braz.). For a detailed
description of the role of the young reformers, see McALLISTER, supra note 1, at 73-74.
32. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing use of the term "procuracy").
33. McALLs-rER, supra note 1, at 57.
34. See Gidi, supra note 6, at 323-24 & n.21 (comparing and contrasting the class
action device in the United States and in Brazil).
35. The phrase was added to the Public Civil Action Law-Lei de Aldo Civil Piilica-in
1985, following the appearance of variants of the phrase throughout the early 1980s.
MCAL.LSTER, supra note 1, at 61-62.
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held by an indeterminate number of people linked by a factual
situation.
36
Thus, as she indicates, forest conservation is a "diffuse interest."
"[Collective interests] are transindividual, indivisible interests held
by a determinable number of people of a particular group, class, or
category who are united through a basic legal relationship. An
example would be the protection of the lands of a certain indige-
nous group."37 That such interests could have a voice represented
a remarkable legal innovation in Brazil, and in civil law systems
generally, since doctrinally, "[t]o allow courts to protect group
rights, civil law systems must abandon the orthodox and individual-
istic principles of civil procedure, which traditionally have
demanded the existence of a personal and direct interest in the
outcome of the litigation and thus have not allowed such absentee
representation." 38
In Professor McAllister's estimation, the 1981 National Environ-
mental Policy Act-a procedural environmental-review statute in
broad terms comparable to the U.S. statute of the same name 39-
was of central importance because it "was the first law to authorize
the Minist6rio Pfiblico to act on behalf of a diffuse interest."40 Sub-
sequently, this authority made its way into the 1988 Constitution,
along with the power to protect consumer interests and cultural
patrimony,41 changes secured in considerable measure by the
efforts of the young reformers Professor McAllister admires. As a
result, she avers, "[i]n what has been referred to as the greatest
institutional novelty of the 1988 Constitution, the Minist6rio Pfib-
lico was largely successful in getting the profile it sought,"42 a pro-
file that would allow it to "play a primary role in the defense of
societal interests and ... [maintain] a high level of independence
at both the institutional and individual levels." 43 What emerged
from this period of redemocratization and Minist6rio Pfiblico insti-
tution building was, according to Professor McAllister, an institu-
36. Id. at 210 n.1.
37. Id. at 58, 210 n.1.
38. Gidi, supra note 6, at 363.
39. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2006).
40. MCALLISTER, supra note 1, at 67.
41. Id. at 70-71.
42. Id. at 71 (citing Fdbio Kerche, 0 Minist rio Ptiblico e a constituinte de 1987/88, in 0
SISTEMA DEJuS-cA 61 (M.T. Sadek ed., 1999).
43. Id. at 74 (referencing HuGo NIGRO MAZZILLI, 0 MINISTERIO POBLICO NA CONSTITUI-
QAO DE 1988 20 (1989)).
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tion that "aligned itself with societal interests and proclaimed itself
a representative of environmental and other social interests.."
44
From this point forward in her narrative, Professor McAllister
frequently uses this "environmental and other" formulation,
although she focuses, with rare exceptions, only on the environ-
mental activities of the procuracy. 45 Furthermore, the quoted
phrase reveals a weakness in Professor McAllister's method that
should concern any critical student of Brazil specifically and Latin
America more generally. Specifically, she is prone to such sweep-
ing assertions like the claim that the Ministerio Ptiblico "aligned
itself with societal interests."46 But one must ask, what societal
interests specifically? Brazil, the country with both the largest con-
tiguous physical territory and the second-largest population in the
Americas is, like the United States, a country with notable racial
and ethnic diversity and cultural heterogeneity.47 Moreover, Brazil
is one of the most economically unequal countries in the world;
the richest 10 percent of its population hold nearly 50 percent of
the wealth, for example, while the poorest 20 percent hold 2.5 per-
cent.48 In fact, by many estimates using the standard Gini-coeffi-
cient comparison to measure income distribution, Brazil is one of
the most unequal countries in the world. 49 In short, Brazil can
thus be characterized as a rich country governed by a wealthy, tal-
ented, and well-educated elite, with millions upon millions living in
misery. Consequently, it is problematic to speak of "societal inter-
ests" as if they are monolithic. To be sure, today most people in
any country would define themselves as "environmentalists" to the
extent that everyone wants to drink clean water and breathe unpol-
luted air. But the suggestion that the Ministdrio Ptiblico thus stood
to represent the "societal interests" of hundreds of millions of peo-
ple in a country where those interests are inherently contradictory,
44. Id. at 75.
45. See, e.g., id. at 83 (asserting that the Minist~rio Pfiblico "gained authority to legally
defend the 'diffuse and collective' interests of society-environmental and other so-called
public interests").
46. Id. at 75.
47. See generally CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2008), https://
www.cia.gov/library/publicaions/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html (providing various
facts on Brazil). Estimates comparing the United States and Brazil, of course, include
Alaska and Hawaii in their estimations of national territory.
48. U.K DEP'T FOR INT'L DEV., THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE FOR BRAZIL 1, available
at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/brazildevchallenge.pdf (quoting these and related
comparative statistics) (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
49. See, e.g., id.
2009]
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especially because of the country's appalling income divide, simply
overreaches.
This criticism relates, furthermore, to a central feature of the
volume's methodology. Specifically, Professor McAllister organizes
her analysis-and designed her fieldwork-to examine the work of
the Minist~rio Pdiblico in two very different states, namely Sdo
Paulo and Pari states. Professor McAllister's fieldwork focusing on
these states involved a total of approximately eight months, during
the period from October 2001 through mid-May 2002.50 She
spent the majority of this time in Sdo Paulo, the country's wealthi-
est and largest city, and only two months in the poor, parched,
much-less-developed northeastern state of Pardi. 51 In other words,
she designed her project to examine two extremes-from Brazil's
most privileged, most prosperous urban center to one of its long-
est-suffering and poorest provinces. Conceptually, the contrast is
provocative and potentially revealing, because the places are differ-
ent in so many ways: demographics, geography, and degree of
development, to cite just three.52 As might be expected, Professor
McAllister discovered wide differences in the enforcement capacity
and zeal of prosecutors in the different places. 53 This is not a star-
tling conclusion, but it is useful that Professor McAllister has docu-
mented it. These differences confirm, furthermore, the need to
work on institution building in Brazil's poorer states, which are
also often places plagued by centuries of patronage politics and
hegemonic economic control by powerful but numerically small
elites.5
4
At the same time, as useful and stark as this comparison is, it
hardly merits sweeping generalizations about the Ministfrio Ptib-
50. McALLISTER, supra note 1, at xiii-xv (the field work with the Minist~rio Ptiblico
offices did not take up the entire period, presumably because of the Christmas, New Year's,
and Carnival holidays).
51. Id.
52. Some of the differences are detailed. Id. at 8-10. On the stark and persistent
regional divides and inequalities that characterize Brazil, see generally, for example,
TimothyJ. Power &J. Timmons Roberts, A New Brazil? The Changing Sociodemographic Con-
text of Brazilian Democracy, in DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL: AcroRs, INSTITUTIONS, AND PROCESSES 236
(Peter R. Kingstone & TimothyJ. Power eds., 2000).
53. See MCALLISTER, supra note 1, 20-56 (comparing records of agencies at federal and
state levels, especially as between the states of Sao Paulo and Parni).
54. By "patronage politics" I refer to a political system in which rewards are distrib-
uted by powerful local political bosses. See, e.g., David Maybury-Lewis, The Persistent
Patronage System, in BRAZILIAN MOSAIC: PORTRAITS OF A DIVERSE PEOPLE AND CULTURE 153,
154-55 (G. Harvey Summ ed., 1995).
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lico across a vast and diverse nation.5 5 Brazil is marked by huge
income differentials, and they are nowhere more marked than
between the elites of Sdo Paulo and the poor of the northern and
northeastern states like Pardi. But there is also a huge middle. It
would have been interesting, for example, to know whether the
relatively more prosperous, economically homogeneous states in
the south, like Parami and Santa Catarina, fit into Professor McAl-
lister's broad generalizations. Professor McAllister reports that
indeed she canvassed several other states, including the southern
states of Parami and Rio Grande du Sul, in 1999 and 2000.56 It is a
pity that these excursions-and the reasons they were not cho-
sen-did not ultimately form part of her story, as they would have
only further deepened the intricate, layered story she tells. The
idea, presumably, was that by looking at the extremes one would
understand the range of experience. But the conditions of the
middle cannot be inferred from the conditions of the extremes.
The limited scope of Professor McAllister's field work might have
simply dictated a more modest, more focused thesis. In addition,
because Professor McAllister's field work was so heavily weighted in
Sdo Paulo (six months), it strains confidence to countenance with-
out reservation the bold comparisons she makes. To be sure, the
examples and the contrast between the states Professor McAllister
studied provide useful information on which to base informed
speculations. But to use these examples as typical of larger
changes throughout a society as large, varied, and complicated as
Brazil's, as when Professor McAllister concludes that the Ministerio
Pdiblico "became the environmental lawyer and negotiator of soci-
ety,"57 is surely to go too far. Perhaps, "the environmental lawyer
of some interests in a large and complex society" would be accurate.
As it happens, while preparing this review, a 30-year-old environ-
mental nonprofit in the city of Sdo Carlos, in Sdo Paulo state,
claimed "one more judicial victory in the environmental defense of
the quality of life in the region." 58 The victory involved the success-
55. She states, for example: "In sum, part of what makes the Ministdrio Pdiblico capa-
ble of being a strong actor in environmental protection is the institutional capacity of the
environmental agencies in its jurisdiction." MCALLISTER, supra note 1, at 87.
56. Lesley K. McAllister, On Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: A Reply to Profes-
sor Crawford's Review of Making Law Matter: Environmental Protection and Legal Institu-
tions in Brazil, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 649, 656 & n.35 (2008).
57. MCALLISTER, supra note 1, at 154.
58. For the full text of the press release, see Press Release, Associacdo para Prote45o
Ambiental de Sao Carlos (APASC), APASC consegue -it6ria judicial que anula acordo
entre o Minist~rio Ptiblico e fazendeiros (Feb. 17, 2008), availabe at http://www.noticen-
tro.com.br/Noticias.asp?Acao=Ler&Id=9403&Categoria=4.
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ful challenge to the action of the Ministrio Pdiblico in the state of
Sdo Paulo in an accord made between its representative and own-
ers of rural property-ranchers-in the city of Riberdo Preto.59
"The annulled accord," a press release stated, "would have permit-
ted the cutting of trees and the suppression of native vegetation
without [obtaining] the required and necessary license from an
appropriate environmental regulator and registering [the area] as
a legal conservation area. '" 60 The press release went on to laud the
Minist6rio Piblico, "without the least shadow of a doubt," as "great
and competent allies in the society in the protection of the essen-
tial public interest and the environment."61 At the same time, it
faulted the Minist~rio Piblico for the practice of freely entering
into agreements called Terms for the Adjustment of Conduct
(termos de ajustamento de condutas), or "TACs."62 The TACs, accord-
ing to the nonprofit, are a type of "friendly agreement for the envi-
ronmental malefactor to adjust its action to the law; however, the
Minist6rio Ptiblico cannot compromise the defense of a healthy
environment, essential to the quality of life, consenting to situa-
tions or practices prejudicial to the primary public interest and/or
the environment."63 The point here is not to bash the Minist6rio
Pfiblico, which, as Professor McAllister and this nonprofit both
acknowledge, has achieved important victories. The point, how-
59. Id.
60. Id. The untranslated text of the press release, dated February 15, 2008, reads as
follows:
APSAC CONSEGUE VITORIA JUDICIAL QUE ANULE ACORDO ENTRE 0
MINISTtRIO PIBLICO E FAZENDEIROS-A Associacdo para Proteqdo
Ambiental de SAo Carlos (APSAC), organiza 5o ndo governarnental que em 2007
completou 30 anos de existoincia, obteve mais urna vit6ria judicial na defesa
ambiental e da qualidade de vida na regifo, ao questionar a atuagdo do Minist~rio
Publico do Estado de SAo Paulo num acordo feito entre o seu representante e os
propriet~rios de urn im6vel rural na cidade de Ribero Bonito. A acordo anulado
permitia a corte de drvores e a supressdo de vegeta4Ao nativa sem o obrigat6ria e
necessirio licenciamento do 6rgdo ambiental competente e postgerava a averba-





The untranslated text reads in full as follows:
Acorre que, As vezes, na medida em que a institui 5o ( representado por seres
humanos, podern acontecer falhas, inclusive nos casos de acordos ou termos de
ajustarnento de condutas (TACs). Nesses acordos, hA urn tipo de conposiqdo
amigAvel para que o infrator de legislagAo ambiental ajuste a sua conduta A lei,
pordm, ndo pode o Ministdrio Pdiblico transigir na defesa do ambiente sadio,
essencial z qualidade da vida, consentindo corn situa 6es ou prtticas prejudiciais
ao interesse pfiblico indisponfvel e do rneio ambiente ....
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ever, is that this more complicated narrative of a Minist~rio Pfiblico
that sometimes serves corporate and other private interests, and is
often alienated from the civil society it nominally represents, is
almost entirely absent from Making Law Matter.
In the experience of this reviewer, at least, the example is not an
isolated one. In September 2007, a state prosecutor in Rio de
Janeiro discussed with me a case the prosecutor's office was pursu-
ing, challenging continued "invasions" of environmentally sensitive
land by the poor.64 The prosecutor suggested to me that, in fact,
the environmental claims, which admittedly had a legal basis, may
in fact have been means rather than ends to assert what might be
characterized as class privilege. 65 That is, the Ministdrio Ptiblico
was listening in the instance to residents of better-heeled areas
using environmental laws to keep the poor away from them, rather
than to those who, invoking other legal grounds, sought to protect
social and economic interests as well. 66 Regrettably, this is not a
story that tends to get written about, both because the Minist~rio
Pfiblico does perform good pro-environmental work, but also
because it is powerful, and people are reluctant to offend its mem-
bers. Yet, again in the experience of this reviewer, this kind of ten-
sion runs deep in the work of the Minist~rio Ptiblico, and anyone
working in the environmental area in Brazil hears frequent talk of
it. Accordingly, one wishes that, in her interviews and other
research, Professor McAllister had been more open to this more
complex reality and less disposed to tell the story the Minist~rio
Pfiblico tells about itself.
Professor McAllister continues to explain that, given its
expanded powers and higher profile as a possible agent of social
change and legal reform, the Ministdrio Pdiblico acquired a kind of
glamour. In particular, in the country's largest and richest city Sdo
Paulo, "[e]ven as hiring and salaries tended to stagnate in the pub-
lic sector in Brazil in the 1990s, the Sdo Paulo Minist~rio Ptiblico
was able to hire more prosecutors and offer very attractive sala-
64. Interview with Humberto Dalla, Promotor de Justia no Estado do Rio de Janeiro,
in Atlanta, Ga. (Sept. 7, 2007).
65. Id.
66. Id. This, of course, is a famous characteristic of prominent U.S. environmental
laws, which use substantive environmental statutory provisions to promote other, collateral
objectives, such as land use and economic regulation. Perhaps the most famous case exam-
ple is TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (using the National Environmental Policy Act and
the Endangered Species Act to stop construction of a $100 million dam project). Professor
McAllister critically discusses the notion of TACs. See McALLISTER supra note 1, at 190-91.
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ries."67 Remarkably, "[b]etween 1985 and 2002, the number of
state and federal prosecutors in Brazil almost doubled."6 Moreo-
ver, along with this growth developed a new esprit de corps among
the prosecutors. Professor McAllister reports that the new "'ideol-
ogy of political voluntarism" 69 among prosecutors was rooted in
two "widely held" beliefs. 70 First, she says, prosecutors believe "that
civil society is too weak and disorganized to defend its own inter-
ests; and second, that the government often violates or offends the
public interest."71 The environment, moreover, at least in Profes-
sor McAllister's account, was more attractive as an object of protec-
tion of "'diffuse and collective rights"' given these beliefs, and
came to supplant "'traditional areas"' of the work of the Ministerio
Pfiblico like criminal prosecution.
72
As intimated above, the history of the Minist~rio Piblico told by
Professor McAllister thus presents the Minist~rio Piiblico in the
1980s and 1990s as a sort of Brazilian-legal-institution white
knight-brash, educated, talented, idealistic young lawyers bent on
bringing out the best in their country, a sort of Brazilian equivalent
of the Kennedy White House. 73 As she explains at the beginning of
her book, it is
about Brazilian prosecutors who function much like public
interest environmental lawyers in other countries. They sue pol-
luters and the government to enforce environmental laws. They
accuse environmental agencies of shirking their duties because
of political pressure. They form, alliances with local environ-
mental groups and the media....
... As individuals and as an institution, prosecutors receive
substantial public attention and acclaim for their environmental
work. Headline enforcement cases... reinforce the notion that
67. Id. at 76.
68. Id.




72. Id. (quoting RocgRio BASTOS ARANTES, MINISTERO P3Buco E POLUTICA NO BRASIL
118-19 (2002)).
73. Not unlike the Minist6rio Pdiblico in Brazil, John F. Kennedy's administration
attracted some of the brightest, best-educated talents of the day, as discussed in several
books. See., e.g., ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS 126-155 (1965) (profiling the
Kennedy administration's selection process for its appointees). But there have been
darker, more nuanced accounts as well, examining how, perhaps also like Brazil's Minis-
t~io Pt(iblico, the Kennedy forces could pursue highly conservative as well as progressive
ends. See, e.g., SEYMOUR HERSH, THE DARK SIDE OF CAMELOT (1997)..
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prosecutors are politically independent from the government
and that they play a vital role in representing public interests.
7 4
Later, she maintains, the noble lads of the Minist6rio Ptiblico
"had the salutary effect of changing the climate of impunity that
had long prevailed in Brazilian environmental law." 75 Professor
McAllister thus reports, but also seems to endorse, the caricature of
Brazilian prosecutors "as being young and idealistic." 76 These are
Good Guys (and they are mostly guys)-Eliot Ness for the Brazilian
set.
In its details, admittedly, the story Professor McAllister tells is
more nuanced. Not surprisingly given their vastly different levels
of development, the results Professor McAllister gathered differed
greatly between Sdo Paulo and Par. Thus, for instance, "[s]tate
prosecutors are much more active in environmental enforcement
in the state of Sdo Paulo than in the state of Par. In Pardi, the
environmental enforcement work of a handful of federal prosecu-
tors [who are often transplants from the wealthy southeastern capi-
tal cities] is more expressive than that of a much larger group of
state prosecutors."77 As Professor McAllister relates, this "differ-
ence in prosecutorial enforcement activity is partly explained by
the extent to which prosecutorial institutions are able to tap
resources from environmental agencies and other environmental
institutions in their regions."78 Consequently,
part of what makes the Minist~rio Pdiblico capable of being a
strong actor in environmental protection is the institutional
capacity of the environmental agencies in its jurisdiction.
Where the corresponding environmental agencies have the
technical resources and political resolve to lend support, prose-
cutors are able to be more productive and successful in their
enforcement work.
79
The claim is unsurprising and virtually self-evident, a logical and
predictable recipe for strong administrative and legal enforcement
in any context.80 Still, as with so many such observations in this
book, Professor McAllister's service is to review and document
these institutional dynamics. The assertion, however, also contra-
74. McALLISTER, supra note 1, at xi.
75. Id. at 85.
76. Id. at 83.
77. Id. at 86.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 87.
80. See generally RICHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINIS-
TRATWE LAW AND PROCESS 1-36 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing theories of legitimation for
administrative action).
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dicts her earlier claims that the Ministfrio Pfiblico stepped into the
breach of weak agency enforcement.81 She seems to conclude that,
in fact, the Minist~rio Ptiblico succeeded most where it worked
hand-in-glove with agencies; yet one of Professor McAllister's cen-
tral laments is that prosecutorial and regulatory antagonism inter-
feres with effective environmental enforcement.8 2 In addition, she
explains, "the most critical factor explaining the differences among
the activity levels of different prosecutorial institutions in Brazil is
the extent of their [executive branch interference]," and also pres-
sure from "powerful economic actors." 83 As Professor McAllister
reiterates throughout this book, the Ministdrio Pfiblico's "political
independence" from the executive branch constitutes one of the
most important values that permitted the institution to achieve suc-
cesses in environmental prosecution .84
Not only is this conclusion central to Professor McAllister's anal-
ysis, it is an important affirmation of the need for an institution
like the Minist~rio Pfiblico in order to achieve some social changes
that might otherwise receive negative official support or even be
undercut by political actors.8 5 She demonstrates, for example, how
prosecutors have often become irritants to regulators, who view
them as pushy and intrusive.8 6 In this way, Professor McAllister's
book helpfully educates English-language students of Brazilian law,
and civil law legal institutions more generally, about the possibili-
ties for robust prosecutorial legal enforcement in an economically
and industrially less-developed country than the United States.8 7
Indeed, Professor McAllister believes that the model of the Brazil-
ian Minist~rio Pdiblico is replicable.88
81. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
82. See MCALLISTER, supra note 1, at 185-86 (providing one example of such
interference).
83. Id. at 87.
84. Id. at 108-09.
85. The importance of enforcement independence in environmental law has been
reinforced by the negative and highly politicized enforcement of the George W. Bush
administration's U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. See, e.g., Randall S. Abate, Automo-
bile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a
"Global Warming Solution" in California, 40 CONN. L. REv. 591, 609-11 (2008) (mentioning
executive efforts to circumvent judicial interference in policy); Andrew D. Finkelman,
Note, The Post-Ratification Consensus Agreements of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol: Law or
Politics? An Analysis of Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 93 IowA L. REv. 667, 706-
07 (2008) (describing the use of critical-use exemptions to seek political ends).
86. See MCALLISTER, supra note 1, at 19, 91, 105, 128 fig.5.1.
87. See id. at 193-95.
88. See id.
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At the same time, the reader cannot help but wish that, in the
end, Professor McAllister had herself been more independent
from her subjects. A central worry of administrative law is the prin-
ciple of capture. Capture describes the situation in which the regu-
lated and the regulator become overly friendly or familiar, such
that the regulator is "captured" by the views of the regulated. 9
Although administrative law struggles to avoid the possibility of
capture by advocating the construction of various firewalls and
other barriers that insulate regulator from the regulated, 90 capture
does not necessarily imply fraud or corruption, but, at a minimum,
it does imply over familiarity that leads to partiality. Reading Pro-
fessor McAllister's book brought to mind the legal literature on
capture because, similarly, she accepts with little criticism the
Minist~rio Piiblico self-characterization of the institution as an
aggressive defender of social interests. As argued above, of course,
the victories of the Minist~rio Piblico in improving environmental
quality, as for example in reducing the notorious industrial pollu-
tion in a city like Cubatdo, in Sdo Paulo state, deserve to be cele-
brated.91 Equally unquestionable is the importance in a relatively
new democracy of a legal institution that can hold governmental
officials and politicians to account for their misdeeds or
omissions.9
2
Yet ultimately this feels like a rather two-dimensional account;
Professor McAllister's book tells the story of the Minist~rio Ptiblico
that the Minist~rio PtNiblico tells of itself to the legal visitor to Bra-
zil-this reviewer included. One yearns for Professor McAllister to
have engaged more critically with her subjects. For instance, she
reports criticism of the governor of the state of Parr, in particular
noting his implication "that federal prosecutors had political
motives in opposing the state's development of canals, dams, and
highways."93 Professor McAllister could have moved beyond simply
relaying the governor's concern and sympathetically (to the prose-
cutors) concluding that the prosecutors in Pard faced "political
89. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on
Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 429, 459-65 (1999) (discussing the risk of agency cap-
ture by the regulated community).
90. See, e.g., PIERCE, JR., SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 80, at 454-99 (surveying devices
for ensuring regulatory impartiality in the U.S. context).
91. See McALLISTER, supra note 1, at 114 (discussing the Cubatdo incident).
92. This is a point emphasized by McAllister. See, e.g., id. at 148 ("The horizontal
accountability provided by the Ministdrio Pfblico makes the environmental agency better
able to assert its jurisdiction over the environmental aspects of the project.").
93. Id. at 110.
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barriers."94 She could have instead inquired into the truth of the
governor's claim. Were the prosecutors in fact motivated politi-
cally? If so, what exactly were their political motivations? Similarly,
when reporting on the frustration of regulators who complain that
they spend a fifth or more of their time simply responding to
Ministtrio Pfiblico information requests, 95 Professor McAllister
might have pressed further to consider whether in fact the Minis-
t6rio Pfiblico is but another impediment to effective and efficient
government in the massive and often maddening Brazilian bureau-
cracy. The same is true of the startling statistic that "[o]nly 37.2
percent of judges give a positive rating to the 'expansion of the
powers of the Ministtrio Ptiblico' in the 1988 Constitution."96
Now, this may be because the much-criticized Brazilian judiciary,
perceived as overly independent 97 and/or corrupt,98 dislikes the
Ministtrio Ptiblico because it knows that the prosecutors may hold
them accountable. But this statistic could also reveal a perception,
and perhaps a reality, that the Ministtrio Piiblico interferes with
the smooth functioning of the Brazilian legal system. It would have
been nice to have such possibilities explored. Such assertions
demand to be scrutinized and unpacked.
This larger failure to question the motives and motivations of the
Ministtrio Pdiblico may be identified throughout the book. On the
one hand, Professor McAllister's book performs an essential and
important task, describing the work of the Minist6rio Piblico as an
environmental-enforcement institution in the crucial generation
after the last dictatorship. On the other hand, the book fails to
address two central questions prompted by this activity, namely,
why environmental enforcement? and why by well-paid govern-
ment lawyers? That is, Professor McAllister asserts that prosecutors
in the Ministtrio Ptiblico "function much like public interest envi-
ronmental lawyers in other countries." 99 In the rare instances
when Professor McAllister provides examples of this claim, they
94. Id.
95. Id. at 128.
96. Id. at 170.
97. Id. at 169 ("While the question in most Latin American countries is whether the
judiciary is sufficiently independent, the debate in Brazil has focused on whether the judi-
ciary has become overly independent." (citing Carlos Santiso, Economic Reform and Judicial
Governance in Brazil: Balancing Independence with Accountability, 10 DEMOCRATIZATION 161,
163 (2003))).
98. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007: CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL
SYSTEMS 142-43 (2007) (discussing some trends, positive and negative, in the functioning of
the Brazilian judiciary and its relation to the Ministdrio Ptfiblico).
99. McALLISTER, supra note 1, at xi.
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support it. For instance, at one point she demonstrates how Sdo
Paulo state prosecutors took on state environmental authorities for
their failure to observe environmental-assessment laws in their zeal
to help push through a Volkswagen automobile plant, a state and
city development priority. 100 However, there are few such detailed
examples; more often than not, we must simply take the author's
word for it. Moreover, if indeed Brazilian prosecutors are so much
like Western public-interest environmental lawyers, it would have
been helpful to ask why these nonprofit-like lawyers took the form
of working for the government and not for the nonprofit sector.
This is not a trivial point: a major feature of post-dictatorship Bra-
zilian political discourse is the debate about how best to build civil-
society institutions.10 1  Moreover, even the Brazilian popular
press-not known for its social progressivism-has spotlighted the
socially transformative role of the nonprofit sector, especially as it
relates to environmental protection. 10
2
It therefore merits asking why the prosecutors Professor McAl-
lister celebrates, those who shaped the Ministirio Pfiblico's envi-
ronmental role, pushed for laws that strengthened the
prosecutorial role, rather than providing mechanisms that might
have encouraged the development of more robust civil-society
institutions. One can imagine, for example, a law creating a citi-
zen-suit provision that would have encouraged civil-society organi-
zations to undertake citizen-based enforcement of environmental
law, as has happened in the United States.10 Such a law might
have included a provision that would have helped fund qualified
nonprofits with judgments for successful prosecutions for environ-
mental violations to help address the chronically underresourced
nonprofit sector. Instead, the often effective but also deeply pater-
100. Id. at 130-32; see also id. at 132-33 (describing the Xuxa Water Park case, another
example of action against environmental agencies and their officials); id. at 114 (reporting
environmental improvements in notoriously polluted Cubatdo district in Sio Paulo State).
101. See, e.g., Kathryn Hochstetler, Democratizing Pressures from Below? Social Movements in
the New Brazilian Democracy, in DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL, supra note 52, at 162, 163-65. In the
environmental context, see, for example, KATHRYN HOCHSTETLER & MARGARET E. KECK,
GREENING BRAZIL: ENVIRONMENTAL AcTivIsM IN STATE AND SOCIETY 11-13 (2007).
102. Felipe Seibel & Tatiana Gianni, ONGs: Os Novos Inimigos do Capitalismo, EXAME,
Oct. 25, 2006, at 22, 24 (headline special report on how environmental non-profits have
undertaken radical positions to defend the environment in Brazil and have so become "the
new enemies of capitalism").
103. 1 refer to the "citizen suit" provisions that are a standard feature of many of the
major U.S. environmental laws enacted in the 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., PHILIP WEINBERG
& KEVIN A. REILLY, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §1.03 (1998). In Brazil, the acao
civil pdblica (public civil action) can serve this role to some extent. See MCALLISTER, supra
note 1, at 62-63.
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nalistic Minist6rio Ptiblico model was chosen. 104 Making Law Matter
never invites the reader to ask why.
Curiously, too, when Professor McAllister says that prosecutors of
the Minist~rio Ptiblico are a lot like nonprofit public-interest attor-
neys in other countries, she does not say what kind of nonprofit
attorney. That is, few nonprofit attorneys in the United States, for
example, start at salaries of about $10,000 per month, which is how
much the highly competitive Minist6rio Pdblico positions pay
young lawyers in some parts of the Brazilian Federative Republic.
This is spectacularly good money for a young lawyer in the United
States; it is a princely sum in Brazil. In my admittedly noncom-
prehensive (but, I suspect, reliable) experience, most nonprofit
attorneys in the United States struggle for years before they make
six figures. Nonetheless, idealistic young attorneys fight to secure
highly competitive jobs in the comparatively limited nonprofit
environmental-advocacy sector. This matters because a person who
earns a third of what she could earn but who has made a commit-
ment to work in the substantive area-whether it be environmental
law or some other area in the public-interest area-is, in any coun-
try, going to be a somewhat different person from the one who
opts for a career in one of the best-remunerated professional tracks
in his or her country, with the added bonus that he or she can
work in an area seen to be in the public good.10 5 One can only
104. On the deeply entrenched nature of paternalism and elite control in Brazilian
culture, history, and society, see, for example, Riordan Roett, The Patrimonial State, in BRA-
ZILIAN MosAic, supra note 54, at 181, 181-84 (observing, inter alia, that "[o]ne of the leading
attributes of the Brazilian political system is its elitist nature. Regardless of the time period,
politics in Brazil have been dominated by a relatively small group of individuals who have
been able to manipulate the mass of the population and define the goals of the state in
their own terms.").
105. By contrast to the prosecutors of the Minist~rio Ptlblico, a young environmental
lawyer at one of the most prominent environmental groups in a city like Atlanta earns
about $40,000-$60,000, E-mail from Justine Thompson, Esq., Executive Director, Greenlaw
(Apr. 14, 2009, 10:17 EST) (on file with author), while a starting associate at a big private
firm will earn in the range of $125,000-$150,000. See, e.g., Nationwide Pay Raise Watch:
King & Spaulding, http://abovethelaw.com/2007/10/nationwide-pay-raise-watch kin 1.
php (reprinting a memorandum from the Atlanta firm of King & Spaulding confirming a
rise in first-year compensation to $152,000); see also Findlaw, Firm Salaries & Other Statis-
tics Charts, Atlanta, http://www.infirmation.com/shared/insider/payscale.tcl?state=GA
(last visited May 2, 2009). This is approximately what a young member of the Brazilian
procuracy earns. The salary of the lawyers who work for the Minist~rio Poblico is provided
for in Brazilian law. See Lei No. 7.725, de 31 de janeiro de 1989, D.O.U. de 02.09.1981
(Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil/leis/1989_1994/L7725.htm. As of
early 2009, the gross annual salary of a young lawyer was R$273,000. At the exchange rate
of R$2.1 to the U.S. dollar on April 17, 2009, that converts to $130,000, a sum that excludes
other perks such as travel and meal bonuses. E-mail from Dr. Antonio do Passo Cabral,
Rio dejaneiro Ministfrio Pziblico (Apr. 15, 2009, 13:08 EST) (on file with author) (confirm-
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assume, therefore, that when Professor McAllister speaks of non-
profit public-interest attorneys, she is speaking of the nearest U.S.
equivalent, namely the handful of lawyers working for a small num-
ber of better-financed, more-mainstream environmental groups,
like the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council.
In short, more definitional clarity would have helped the reader
better understand her theoretical-analytical framework and
assumptions.
Professor McAllister notes that environmental nonprofits tend to
be weak and underfunded in Brazil, lacking the resources to file
environmental litigation themselves. 10 6 But for the most part, Mak-
ing Law Matter does not ask why this is so. The point of this critique
is, once again, not unimportant. A central claim of Professor McAl-
lister's is that the Ministrio Ptiblico has come to be a central
means "to solving a historical problem of the Brazilian legal sys-
tem-the problem of 'access to justice."' 0 7 What is left unan-
swered by this praise for the Ministdrio Ptiblico, however, are the
questions of what kind of justice is thus made available, and for
whom. Yet Professor McAllister does not seem to have spent much
time in her eight months of field work in the two states that princi-
pally concern her speaking with members of civil-society environ-
mental groups, although she clearly spoke a good deal with
prosecutors of the Ministirio Ptiblico and imbibed their profes-
sional identity. One possibly rich avenue for investigation would
have been an analysis that was more rooted in Brazil's history and
social map. Specifically, Brazil was for centuries dominated by an
economic oligarchy-even when nominally a monarchy. Brazilians
to this day speak of the "colonels" (coroneis), a term rich with a
mixture of fear and contempt to describe a selfish and corrupt rul-
ing elite, the history of which does much to explain Brazil's current
income divide. 10 8 At the same time, the sociological and political-
ing these figures). It is small wonder, then, that this and other high-paying government
jobs are the most sought after by Brazil's best and brightest. See Carelli, supra note 10
(describing the number of people competing for well-paid government posts).
106. MCALLISTER, supra note 1, at 153. As she notes, most environmental nonprofits in
Brazil tend to be small in size and depend inordinately on the cooperation of the Minis-
t~rio Pfiblico. Id. at 157-58.
107. Id. at 152.
108. As Boris Fausto, perhaps the country's leading historian, has written, "[t]he Brazil-
ian government has been misused by a clever elite" and that "[f]or certain, market forces
(oligopolistic forces?) will not make investments according to social priorities, nor will they
attend to the basic needs of Brazil's people." BoRIs FAUSTO, A CONCISE HISTORY OF BRAZIL
335 (Arthur Brakel trans., 1999); see also THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, BRAZIL: Fiv CENTrURJES OF
CHANGE 237 (1999) ("Could Brazil expect to become a modern nation with its small
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science literature on Brazilian society uniformly notes that one
consequence of oligarchic rule, whether in the coffee fazendas
(large farms) of Rio de Janeiro and Sdo Paulo states or in the
mines of Minas Gerais or in the sugar fields of Bahia, is a patron-
worker relationship that still structures much of social relations
and, especially, the expectations of lower-income people that they
will be taken care of by a patron. 10 9 Looked at in this context, the
Minist~rio Ptiblico might be seen as yet another manifestation of
that relationship: the rich and more privileged members of Brazil-
ian society deciding what is best for the uneducated multitudes. 110
Indeed, I once heard a state prosecutor, who like the men
described in Professor McAllister's book began his career as a crim-
inal prosecutor but moved increasingly to environmental matters,
lecture a class of U.S. students I was teaching in Brazil that they
must "never visit a favela," meaning the often drug-controlled shan-
tytowns that are a sad part of the landscape of most Brazilian cities.
Of course, one anecdote about one talk from a single prosecutor
does not prove a point about class bias, but it does hint at such
one. To be specific, it suggests a fear of the well-to-do to mix with
the poor. Professor McAllister never appears to have explored
such biases with her subjects. Although she does report that
"[s] tudies have shown that prosecutorial careers have become
increasingly open to candidates that do not have familial connec-
tions and to candidates from lower socioeconomic back-
grounds,""' she simply does not ask the more fundamental
question, which is, again, why environmental law and not some
other area with "diffuse and collective" effects? She also does not
ask the prosecutors, for example, how they understand the nature
minority of rich and super-rich inside their barricaded apartment blocks, while most
Brazilians could barely enter the national market?").
109. See generally Roett, supra note 104 (examining how political elites manipulate
power to maintain dominance in the patrimonial state of Brazil); see also Kurt Weyland, The
Brazilian State in the New Democracy, in DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL, supra note 52, at 37 (noting the
persistence of clientelism in Brazil, despite the arrival of democratic rule).
110. In fact, Professor McAllister's text provides an example that proves the point. As
she notes, Ant6nio Herman Benjamin, now a judge of the nation's second-highest court,
the Superior Tribunal de Justica, suggested to the Justice Minister the creation of a com-
mission of specialists to draft an environmental crimes law. He was subsequently
appointed the general secretary of the new commission, which ended up shaping the very
same law. The story reveals the exceptional degree to which personal relations, particu-
larly among the elite, control Brazilian political and civic life. See McALLISTER, supra note
1, at 126.
111. Id. at 188 (citing Maria Tereza Sadek & Rosangela Batista Cavalcanti, The New
Brazilian Public Prosecution: An Agent of Accountability, in DEMOCRATIc ACCOUNTABILIT IN
LATIN AMERICA 218 (S. Mainwaring & C. Welna eds., 2003)).
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of their responsibility to the public. In fact, Making Law Matter
makes clear that the Minist~rio Ptiblico's members have been zeal-
ous guardians of their role, rarely permitting others to infringe on
their territory. 112 One begins to suspect that the Ministerio Piib-
lico insists upon democratic values and transparency for others,
but not for itself.
In short, the text of Making Law Matter makes clear that Profes-
sor McAllister unabashedly and enthusiastically holds the Minis-
t~rio Pfiblico's prosecutors in the highest esteem." 3 Perhaps this is
merited, but one would like to have seen greater critical distance;
Making Law Matter never demonstrates the phenomenon associ-
ated with an observation of Joan Didion's about the writer's
moment of "betrayal" of his or her subject, when confidences and
new friendships are put aside in favor of critical assessment. 114 In
part, this is because there is so little historical and social context in
Making Law Matter outside the somewhat rarefied and insulated
world of the Minist~rio Pfiblico. Since the end of the dictatorship
in 1984, Brazil has spawned numerous noteworthy social move-
ments, many of which include demands related to increased envi-
ronmental protection, particularly those movements-to date
largely unsuccessful-demanding land reform. The best-known of
these is the rural Movimento Sem Terra (Landless Workers' Move-
ment), in addition to its lesser-known urban counterpart, the Movi-
mento Sem Tetos (Homeless Workers' Movement), whose members
take up residence in abandoned state-owned buildings in major
urban centers and demand government assistance in the form of
jobs, health care, child care, and housing programs. I know from
working with the latter of these groups that they have sought the
aid of the Minist6rio Pdiblico, sometimes with environmentally
focused complaints, such as demands for improved sanitation or a
more secure water supply. They have almost always done so with-
out success. 115 As Professor McAllister notes, "[a]ccording to the
112. See id. at 185, 191-92 (in the latter pages noting that, in part, this characteristic has
institutional and structural origins).
113. See, e.g., id. at 69-76 (describing the Ministerio Pdblico's rise to power and attend-
ant successes); id. at 157-61 (repeating the Minist6rio Piblico's vision of itself as the "lawyer
of society").
114. On this topic generally, see HENRY F. WOLCOTr, THE ART OF FIELD WORK 139-44
(2d ed. 2005). Didion is actually supposed to have said that "I am so small, so neurotic,
and so inoffensive that people invariably forget an important point: the writer will do you
in." Id. at 140.
115. Interview with Directorate, Rio deJaneiro City branch, Movimento pela Moradia, in
Rio deJaneiro, Braz. (June 13, 2007). This group, whose name literally means "Movement
for Shelter," is involved in the occupation of a state hospital in Rio's Cajd favela Id. Mem-
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principle of obligation, prosecutors must respond to all environ-
mental problems that they become aware of."116 But this does not
mean all are treated equally: "The citizens or groups that complain
most get the prosecutors' attention, while other more significant
environmental problems are ignored."1 7 Studies subsequent to
Professor McAllister's book would, one hopes, try to sort out not
just the number of cases prosecuted, as she does, but ask why the
Minist~rio Pdiblico chose to prosecute those cases it did, and why
they listened to those voices they did, since, as Professor McAllister
goes on to show, there is some room for maneuvering inside the
"principle of obligation."'1 8 The problem is this: prosecutors
mostly come from privileged classes, and even when moved by what
Professor McAllister agrees is "political voluntarism" or when desir-
ous to create a more politically accountable social order, they may
tend to limit their activism to serve the interests of their class. 119 I
asked that same prosecutor who told my students never to visit a
favela how we knew that the cases he picked would be the ones
Brazilians most wanted to see pursued, and he said, "you just have
to trust my judgment." The point here is that this perspective is
likely typical of the prosecutorial (or any) class,' 20 and it goes
uninvestigated by Professor McAllister in her eagerness to cele-
brate their (admittedly, often important) environmental work.
This is especially regrettable inasmuch as a major weakness of the
Ministrio Pfiblico (noted by Professor McAllister) is that its ranks
bers of the same group occupy an abandoned state administrative building next to Rio's
state assembly in the downtown Cinelandia neighborhood. Interview with Directorate, Rio
de Janeiro City branch, Movimento pela Moradia, in Rio de Janeiro, Braz. (June 11, 2008).
Both of these are locations of field visits by the Human Rights Law Seminar offered as part
of the Summer Legal & Policy Study in Rio de Janeiro, for which the author of this Review
serves as Program Director.
116. McALLISTER, supra note 1, at 162.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 163-64. Professor McAllister usefully reports percentages of cases and where
they originated, for example, id. at 155-56. But she seldom takes apart the statistics, which,
as suggested above, may mask a more complicated reality of personal choice and social
bias.
119. Of course, this phenomenon is hardly limited to Brazil. Criticisms of this phe-
nomenon are common, as, for instance, in the U.S. Critical Legal Studies Movement of the
1980s and 1990s. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE
POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (arguing that law
school provides ideological training for service in the hierarchies of what the author calls
the corporate welfare state).
120. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 164-67 (1975).
Compare in the Brazilian context, Maybury-Lewis, supra note 54 (evaluating the historical
and continued dominance of social hierarchies in Brazilian life).
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are largely unaccountable. 121 This fact alone, given that prosecu-
tors played such a key role in strengthening the Minist~rio Pfib-
lico's institutional power, may support the hunch that prosecutors
in the Ministerio Piiblico largely serve their own socioeconomic
interests rather than those of the entire society.
To be sure, environmental problems touch us all. However, as
the environmental justice movement has so powerfully demon-
strated in recent years, they do not affect all of us equally.' 2 2 To
this end, Professor McAllister's book reveals little about these sorts
of cases; hers is a story of objective successes based on numbers,
with little textured description of the kinds of battles prosecutors
fight and, again, which ones they choose not to fight. In part, this
is because Professor McAllister has opted for a descriptive method,
common in the social sciences, that makes reference to personal
interviews but virtually never gives the identity of the source. 2.1
Sometimes, this is understandable, as where she quotes a prosecu-
tor critical of a state judge-the interlocutor merits anonymity
where identification might compromise his or her career. 124 The
method, however, keeps the author in total control of the informa-
tion and does not allow the reader to make judgments about the
sources. All sources are not created equal, and it would help the
reader to get some sense of who these sources are, and of the
strengths and biases of Professor McAllister's unnamed sources.
Structurally, too, the study might have been trimmed of some of
its many repetitions in Chapters 5-7 (Chapter 7 is especially dupli-
cative in much of its content). This would have allowed room for a
more critical examination of the people in, and choices made by,
the Minist~rio P-iblico.
A great strength of Professor McAllister's book is the fact that it
does what so little comparative legal analysis of Latin America does,
namely examines institutional success and functioning, as opposed
121. See McALLISTER, supra note 1, at 187-92. Professor McAllister criticizes the Minis-
tfrio Pilblico's lack of accountability and endorses the views of other scholars that the
institution needs to increase its accountability. Id. at 192.
122. See generally THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila
Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008) (exploring the inequalities in environmental decisions, especially
with respect to undesirable facilities and activities as they affect U.S. communities of color).
Environmental justice is a newer concept in Brazil but nonetheless has gained traction
there. See HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 101, at 216-22; HENRI ACSELRAD, SELENE
HERCULANO & Josr AuGusTo PADUA, JUSTICA AMBIENTAL E CIDADANA1 24 (2d ed. 2004).
123. As, for example in this typical instance, where a source is described as a "scholar
and former Sao Paulo environmental agency official." McAllister, supra note 1, at 85,
124. See id. at 170.
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to merely describing and analyzing laws on the books. 125 Given the
strategic success of the proponents of the Ministrrio Pfiblico in the
late 1980s, for example, it is fascinating to learn that despite its
institutional profile, the Minist6rio Pfiblico has done a poor job at
ensuring consistency in enforcement, given "the strong emphasis
on the functional independence of each prosecutor."'126 This has
resulted in a lack of institution-wide planning that, Professor McAl-
lister implies, ultimately may impede the highest possible function-
ing of the Ministrrio Piblico.127 Likewise, Professor McAllister's
analysis of differences in prosecutorial styles and the consequences
of such differences for successful enforcement will be useful to all
students of institutional legal behavior, and not just comparative
legal scholars of Latin America specifically and the developing
world more generally. Her conclusion that a legal institution like
the Ministerio Pfiblico performs an essential role in assuring "hori-
zontal accountability" (meaning holding branches of government
accountable to one another)128 is a provocative assertion and mer-
its being tested and evaluated in future studies. The same is true of
the claim that the model of "Brazilian prosecutorial enforcement
stands as an example of 'state-society synergy,' "129 which
"involve[es] a reciprocal relationship between civic engagement
and effective state institutions, in which each strengthens the
other."130 However, given the lack of social context and informa-
tion about what cases the Ministrrio Pdiblico chooses, which ones it
rejects, and why, such assertions invite further analysis. It will be
left to future scholars to examine such conclusions with even more
detailed empirical work and to create in the process, one hopes,
even stronger legal institutions.
125. The legal antecedents that helped influence this methodological choice to focus
on groups and not merely describe laws is one she explores briefly elsewhere, with atten-
tion to the Brazilian case. See Lesley K. McAllister, Revisiting a "Promising Institution": Public
Law Litigation in the Civil Law World, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 693, 696-704 (2008) (describing
the development of comparative law scholarly focus on public law litigation).
126. MCALLISTER, supra note 1, at 116.
127. Id. at 118 ("[T] he development and implementation of institutional plans did not
become important aspects of the Minist~rio Ptiblico's work. While they have been pre-
pared each year since 1993, they are criticized for being too general and lacking useful-
ness, and they are not considered an important reference point for environmental
prosecutors.") (footnote and citation omitted).
128. Id. at 148.
129. Id. at 158 (quoting PETER B. EvANs, STATE-SOCIETY S-YNERGr. GOVERNMENT AND
SOCIAL CAPITAL IN DEVELOPMENT (1997); PETER B. EVANS, LIVABLE CITIES? URBAN STRUG-
GLES FOR LIVELIHOOD AND SUSTAINABILITY (2002)).
130. Id.
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At the same time, this near-exclusive focus on institutional func-
tioning results in an account that loses sight of the substantive
gains and objectives of the prosecutors she studied.13 1 On occa-
sion, when Professor McAllister does examine the actual substance
of the Minist~rio Piblico's efforts, she appears to be trying to force
her thesis that Minist~rio Ptiblico prosecutors are essentially like
public-interest lawyers in the United States. Thus, for instance, she
explains that a "significant percentage of the Ministerio Pfiblico's
environmental lawsuits are against the Brazilian government,
whether municipal, state, or federal."1 32 In her telling, "signifi-
cant" varies from 12 percent of public civil actions filed to half of
the lawsuits filed by a particular office in a given state.1 33 Yet simply
reciting percentages of cases investigated and filed is rather like
describing the size of the tip of an iceberg; it only hints at the com-
plexity of the larger narrative, especially when the range of "signifi-
cance" is so considerable. One hopes that future studies will delve
more deeply into the substantive side of the work of the Ministerio
Piblico, although such studies will require more sustained engage-
ment than the eight months of field study undertaken by Professor
McAllister for this book.
A similar criticism can be leveled at her painstaking and detailed
description of the role played by many of the idealistic Young
Turks described in the book. The group that ultimately produced
some of the country's most celebrated environmental lawyers and
scholars, many of whom have risen to places of prominence in the
bar and bench, were key players who pushed for the redefined and
expanded powers of the Minist~rio Pfiblico. 134 Once again, on the
one hand, Professor McAllister's account is a tremendous resource
131. Speaking of the kinds of cases being examined by prosecutors in Sdo Paulo state,
Professor McAllister tantalizingly explains that "[slubjects of investigation [-that is, a wide-
ranging took at particular problems in a large area-] included air pollution, noise pollu-
tion, leaking underground storage tanks at gas stations, and illegal squatting in the water-
shed of the city reservoir." Id. at 119. This leaves the reader hungry to know more of these
cases.
132. Id. at 113.
133. Id. at 114.
134. I refer, for example, to three of the principal protagonists of her book, Edis
Milar6, Paulo Affonso Leme Machado, and Ant6nio Herman Benjamin. The first two are
among Brazil's most respected environmental-law commentators. As examples of their
work, see, respectively, EImS MiLAIjE, DnEiTO DO AMBIENTE: A GESTAO AMBIENTAL EM Foco
(5th ed. 2007); PAULO AFFONSO LEME MACHADO, DIREITO AMBIENTAL BRASILEIRO (17th ed.
2009). The third, now a senior federal judge, is also perhaps the best known Brazilian
analyst of Brazilian law who writes in English. For an example of his work, see Ant6nio
Herman Benjamim, Cludia Lima Marqus & Catherine Tinker, The Water Giant Awakes:
An Overview of Water Law in Brazil, 83 TEX. L. REv. 2185 (2005).
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for those wishing to understand the institution building that consti-
tutes part of the process of creating a democratic and accountable
legal and governmental structure. On the other hand, it again
would have been useful to get a more textured sense of their
motives, to understand why for these middle- and upper-middle
class young men the environment was an important cause when
there are other causes-tax equality, health care, child care,
worker's rights, housing, and land reform-demanding equal (if
not more) desperate attention and touching "diffuse and collective
interests." For instance, Professor McAllister describes the history
and compromises that led to the bill creating the Ministerio Pib-
lico, and the fact that the bill favored by the Minist~rio Pdiblico
included the phrase "any other diffuse interest;" this version, how-
ever, was vetoed by President Sarney to allow merely three classes
of interest-"the environment, consumers, and cultural patri-
mony.' 35 Yet she does not question the motives of those prosecu-
tors who themselves limited the interests they and their
professional heirs could prosecute. Surely it merits asking why
these children of privilege, even if idealistic and possessed of zeal
to work in the public good, had the limited conception that they
did. Yet Professor McAllister never asks such questions.
Similarly, it would have been helpful to get a fuller sense of the
prosecutorial docket to be able better to judge whether, in fact, the
Ministrio Ptiblico is as successful as it-and as Professor McAl-
lister, its newest U.S. spokesperson-claims it to be. In 2007 and
2008, and not for the first time in recent history, deforestation in
the Amazon again reached alarmingly high levels. 136 It therefore
merits asking, where was the Ministfrio Pfiblico? Making Law Mat-
ter makes scattered references to Minist~rio Ptiblico cases but pro-
vides little sense of the sorts of issues that compel prosecutorial
attention and why.
135. McALLIsrER, supra note 1, at 70. Jos6 Sarney, president of the Republic from
1985-1989, is best known as a member of the political and social elite from one of the
poorest northern states, Maranhao, and as one who used his skills manipulating the
patronage system to ascend to what in the end amounted to a failed term as president. See,
e.g., SKIDMORE, supra note 108, at 190-93. Skidmore records, for example, that "[a] poll in
mid-January 1989 in greater Rio and Sao Paulo registered a 70 percent 'no confidence'
rating for [President Sarney]." Id. at 193.
136. Professor McAllister's data on deforestation only goes through 1997. McALLISTER,
supra note 1, at 100. The Brazilian popular press, however, continues to raise alarm over
the rate of deforestation. See, e.g., Leonardo Coutinho &Josd Edward, Amazfnia: A Verdade
Sobre a Satide da Floresta, VEJA, Mar. 26, 2008, at 95, 101 (reporting an increase in deforesta-
tion of 30 percent "in recent months").
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Professor McAllister is to be celebrated for turning our attention
to Brazil, South America's largest economy and its most populous
and geographically most-diverse country. Despite its size, oddly,
Brazil remains somewhat outside our sights, perceived, if at all, as a
huge tropical forest and a few famous beaches with scantily clad
women. While the Western media obsesses about our relations
with China and India, Brazil tends to get overlooked, even though,
with Russia, India, and China, it comprises one of the so-called
BRIC nations and will likely play an important role in world trade
and geo-politics in this century. 137 Yet Brazil is not front and
center stage for most U.S. readers, its lawyers and legal scholars
included. This is reflected, in fact, in Professor McAllister's
English-language legal sources, the most important of which date
back to a 1988 Roger Findley article and to seminal but now dated
articles by Keith Rosenn through 2000 only.'38 Since then, the
quantity and quality of legal writing about Brazil in U.S. journals
has been surprisingly limited, if increasing and improving, respec-
tively.139 Making Law Matter is thus important precisely because it
draws our attention to the need for more solid legal writing-like
Professor McAllister's book-on Brazil. Because of the importance
of protecting Brazil's environment, not only for its public, but also
for the planet and for a secure future of sustainable global trade,
one can only hope that this is changing. Without question, Profes-
sor McAllister's book is an important contribution to a renewed
interest in Brazilian legal studies in the United States.
137. See, e.g., Roberta Paduan, 0 Avanfo dos Emergentes, EXAME, Oct. 25, 2006, at 36-38
(on the "advance of the emergent" BRIC countries).
138. Roger W. Findley, Pollution Control in Brazil, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1988); see also
McALuSTER, supra note 1, at 251 (citing several works by Keith S. Rosenn).
139. Good examples of some newer legal writing in English about Brazil include
Benjamim et al., supra note 134; R6mulo Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Seeing the Forest for the
Treaties: The Evolving Debates on Forest and Forestry Activities Under the Clean Development Mecha-
nism Ten Years After the Kyoto Protocol 31 FoRDH"aa INr'L L.J. 634 (2008).
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